Duty and Forseeability

Negligence is “conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk”. [1]

Duty and standard of care.

The standard of conduct can arise from common law principles. It can also be prescribed by legislative enactment.[2]

The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable [person] the requirements of a legislative enactment . . . whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part

(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and

(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and

(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and

(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.[3]

Violation of a statute or ordinance is evidence of negligence, not – with certain specific exceptions – negligence per se.[4] A statutory violation is not negligence where the violation is due to some cause beyond the violator’s control, and ordinary care could not have guarded against the violation.[5]

Forseeability.

The concept of foreseeability determines the scope of one’s duty.[6] Foreseeability depends on whether the injury should have been recognized by common experience, the special experience of the alleged wrongdoer, or by a person of ordinary prudence and foresight.[7] It is not necessary that the defendant should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred. The harm sustained need only be within the general field of danger covered by the defendant’s duty.[8]

The is a short summary of the law of duty and forseeability under the Washington law of negligence. It is not a substitute for legal advice.


[1] Schneider v. Strifert, 77 Wash. App. 58, 888 P.2d 1244 (1995) citing Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn.2d 424, 435, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (quoting William L. Prosser, Torts § 43, at 250 (4th ed. 1971)).

[2] Id., citing Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d (1992).

[3] Id., citing Hansen, at 480; Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn.2d 655, 659-60, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983).

[4] RCW 5.40.050.

[5] Hansen, at 483.

[6] Christen v. Lee, 113 Wn.2d 479, 493, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989).

[7] Gordon v. Deer Park Sch. Dist. 414, 71 Wn.2d 119, 124-25, 426 P.2d 824 (1967). See generally W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 32, at 175, 185 (5th ed. 1984).

[8] Christen, at 492 (citing Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wn.2d 975, 981, 530 P.2d 254 (1975)).

Posted in Washington Personal Injury Law.